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This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 1998-1999 European Forum 
programme on Recasting the European Welfare State: Options, Constraints, Actors,
directed by Professors Maurizio Ferrera (Universities o f Pavia and Bocconi, Milano) and 
Martin Rhodes (Robert Schuman Centre).
Adopting a broad, long-term and comparative perspective, the Forum will aim to:
■ scrutinize the complex web of social, economic and political challenges to contemporary 
European welfare states;
• identify the various options for, and constraints on institutional reform;
• discuss the role of the various actors in promoting or hindering this reform at the national, 
sub-national and supra-national level;
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The paper examines the gender relations upheld by the Italian welfare state, and 
points out that the reforms of cash transfer programs, which took place after 
1992, reinforce the “male - breadwinner/female - housekeeper” model. This 
model fosters low participation rates and low occupation rates of women, very 
asymmetrical division of domestic labour, and very low fertility rates. The paper 
describes changes in family allowances, tax exemptions, unemployment 
benefits, retirement, old age, and survivors’ pensions, and other means tested 
cash transfers for low income families. I discuss the gender effects of new forms 
of means testing, and their implications for labour supply, participation, and care 
work within the family. I argue that the mismatch between an old model of 
gender relations and the reality of women’s activity within and outside the 






















































































































































































1 he Weii.ac taie is a set of institutions and policies, which redistributes 
resources - either as money transfers or as free or subsidized services - between 
individuals and across different groups of people. The amount of resources 
moved and the specific format chosen to effect these movements deeply affect 
daily life of men and women. It is by now almost obvious to notice that these 
practices affect power relations between men and women within and outside of 
the family, and contribute to define the gender roles of both sexes. The 
development of public services, social assistance and social insurance programs 
and universal citizenship entitlements runs parallel with women's entrance in the 
labour market, allowing participation in the labour force and providing 
employment. The Welfare State contributed to reshaping women's role, to 
changing the traditional division of labour within and outside the family, and 
affected gender relations between men and women in a variety of ways. The 
social notions of gender itself changed as a result of these processes.'
In the English speaking world a large body of literature has explored the 
many faceted relations between gender and the Welfare State (an excellent 
survey of this literature in Orloff (1996)). In the debate on the reform of the 
Italian Welfare State, many issues of redistribution - from rich to poor families, 
from young to old, from North to South, from employed to unemployed - were 
the objects of careful measurement and rich discussion. A broad consensus 
emerged among academics as well as among policy makers about the sources of 
problems and the appropriate directions of change. The academic and policy 
making community was almost silent instead, about redistribution by gender: 
notable exceptions are contributions by F. Bimbi (1998), and C. Saraceno 
(1994), on family policies; and by R. Trifiletti (1997) on more general 
redistributive effects. The specific gender relations fostered by the present 
Welfare State were not examined, almost no measurement was presented on the 
shift of resources between men and women caused by the first attempts of 
reform, and hence no consensus was reached about the need and right direction 
of change in this area.
This article is a first contribution towards a more systematic analysis of 
gender and the Italian Welfare State. I will take into consideration only cash transfer 
programs, and will not deal, here, with the provision of services. Transfers is the 
area where reform activity - actual and proposed changes - is most pronounced. I 
will examine family allowances, tax exemptions, unemployment insurance, old age 
pensions, and the introduction, in some of them for the first time, of means testing. I 
will present the actual situation and discuss some of the proposed reforms.
1 I use "gender" to indicate a set of physical and mental characteristics, and the proper, 
normal, behavior that each culture attributes to people on the basis of their biological sex. 
Gender, therefore, changes widely in time and space, through history and in different cultures 



























































































WOMEN AND WELFARE IN ITALY
I think it is useful to begin by restating how the general effects of the Welfare 
State on gender relations are displayed in the specific Italian case.
First, the Welfare State allows women's participation in the labour 
market and is an important source of women's employment. Italy is an 
extreme case, in comparison with other European countries, in that women's 
participation in the labour force is much lower than in countries with similar per 
capita income (TABLE 1), and women's unemployment, and the difference 
between men's and women's unemployment rates, (TABLE 2) are the largest.
Notwithstanding the abnormally high public debt, the Italian State does 
not spend more on welfare than the European average. What is out of average is 
the ratio between cash transfers - pensions, in particular - higher than in the rest 




























































































Table 1. Participation rates by sex, selected years
1 9 7 3 198 3 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 6
F M T O T F M T O T F M T F M
A u s t r a l ia 4 7 .7 9 1 .1 6 9 .8 52 .1 8 5 .9 6 9 .3 6 2 .3 8 5 .0 7 3 .7 6 4  9 8 5  4
A u s t r ia 4 8 .5 8 3 .0 6 5 .1 4 9 .7 8 2 .2 6 5 .6 5 8 .9 8 0 .8 6 9 .9 6 2  1 8 1 0
B e lg iu m 4 1 .3 8 3 .2 6 2 .2 4 8 .7 7 6 .8 6 2 .8 5 4 .1 * 7 2 .6 * 6 3 .8 5 6 .1 72 .1
C a n a d a 4 7 .2 8 6 .1 6 6 .7 6 0 .0 8 4 .7 7 2 .3 6 5 .3 7 8 .3 7 1 .8 6 7 9 8 1 .7
D e n m a r k 6 1 .9 8 9 .6 7 5 .9 7 4 .2 8 7 ,6 8 0 .9 7 8 .3 8 6 .9 8 2 .6 7 4 .1 8 5  1
F in la n d 6 3 .6 8 0 .0 7 1 .7 7 2 .7 8 2 .0 7 7 .4 7 0 .0 7 7 .6 7 3 .6 7 0 5
’ 7 <
F ra n c e 5 0 .1 8 5 .2 6 7 .8 5 4 .3 7 8 .4 6 6 .4 5 9 .0 7 4 .5 6 6 .7 5 9 9 7 4 .3
G e r m a n y 5 0 .3 8 9 .6 6 9 .4 5 2 .5 8 2 .6 6 7 .5 6 1 .4 7 8 .6 7 0 .2 6 1 .0 8 0 .0
G r e e c e 3 2 .1 8 3 .2 5 7 .1 4 0 .4 8 0 .0 5 9 .9 4 3 .6 7 3 .7 5 8 .6 4 5 .9 7 4  4
I r e la n d 3 4 .1 9 2 .3 6 3 ,5 3 7 .8 8 7 .1 6 2 .7 3 9 .9 * 8 1 .9 * 6 1 .2 * 4 9 .4 7 8 .1
I t a l y 3 3 .7 8 5 .1 5 8 ,7 4 0 .3 8 0 .7 60 .1 4 3 ,3 7 4 ,8 5 8 ,9 4 3 .2 7 5 .1
J a p a n 5 4 .0 9 0 .1 7 1 .7 5 7 .2 89 .1 7 3 .0 6 1 .8 9 0 .2 7 6 .1 6 2 .2 » 9 0 7 °
L u x e m b . 3 5 ,9 9 3 .1 6 4 ,8 4 1 .7 85 .1 6 3 .3 4 4 .8 * 7 7 .7 * 6 1 ,5 * -
N e th e r l a n d s 2 9 .2 8 5 .6 5 7 ,6 4 0 .3 7 7 .3 5 9 .0 5 5 .5 * 8 0 .8 * 6 9 .4 5 8 .3 8 4 2
N  Z e la n d 3 9 .2 8 9 .2 6 4 .5 4 5 .7 8 4 .7 6 5 .3 6 3 .2 8 3 .3 7 3 .2 6 7 .1 8 4 2
N o r w a y 5 0 .6 8 6 .5 6 8 .7 6 5 .5 8 7 .2 7 6 .5 7 0 .8 8 2 .0 7 6 .5 7 4 .3 8 4  8
P o r tu g a l 5 7 .3 # 9 0 .9 # 6 4 .0 5 6 .7 8 6 .9 7 1 .4 6 1 .3 8 2 .5 7 1 .7 6 4 .1 8 1 .5
S p a in 3 3 .4 9 2 .9 6 2 .7 3 3 .2 8 0 .2 5 6 .6 4 2 ,8 7 4 .5 5 8 .6 4 6 2 7 4 .4
S w e d e n 6 2 .6 8 8 .1 7 5 .5 7 6 .6 8 5 .9 8 1 .3 7 5 ,7 7 9 .3 7 7 .5 7 3 .7 7 8 .0
S v i tz e r la n d 5 4 .1 9 4 .6 # 7 7 .7 5 5 ,2 9 3 .5 7 4 .5 5 7 .9 9 2 .5 7 5 .3 6 7 .1 ° 9 6 .8 °
U . K in g d o m 5 3 .2 9 3 ,0 7 3 .0 5 7 .2 8 7 .5 7 2 .4 6 4 .7 8 3 .3 74 .1 6 6 4 8 3  1
U n i te d  S ta te s 5 1 .1 8 6 .2 6 8 .4 6 1 .8 8 4 ,6 73 .1 6 9 .0 8 4 .9 7 6 .9 7 1 .0 8 4 .5
N o r th  A m e r ic a 5 0 .7 8 6 .2 6 8 .2 6 1 .1 8 4 .6 7 3 .0 6 8 .7 8 4 ,2 7 6 ,4
O E C D  E u r 4 4 ,7 8 8 .7 6 7 .1 4 9 .8 8 2 .3 6 5 .8 6 0 .6 80 .1 6 9 .0 -
O E C D  T o t . 4 8 .3 8 8 .2 6 8 .2 55 .1 8 4 .3 6 9 .3 6 1 .6 8 1 .3 7 0 .3 -
Fonte:OECD Employment Outlook, 1996, OECD Main Economic Indicators, July 1998. 




























































































Table 2. Unemployment rates by sex, selected years
1983 1993 1997
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Belgium 19.0 8.6 12.7 6.9 11.9 7.9
Canada 11.1(3) 11.2(3) 10.6 11.7 - -
Denmark 10.5 8.2 13.7 11.3 7.8 7.3
Finland - - 15.7 19.5 14.9 13.2
France 10.8 6.3 13.8 9.9 14.4 10.7
Germany (O.) (8.0) (8.7) (8.4) (8.0) 10.6 9.0
Greece 11.7 5.8 14.2 5.4 14.9 6.2
Ireland 16.5 14.6 12.1 17.3 10.4 10.1
Italy 14.4 5.8 17.3 8.1 16.6 9.3
Japan 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.4 3.4 3.4
Luxembourg 5.3 2.6 1.9 1.5 5.2 2.7
Netherlands 14.7 11.1 10.5 5.7 6.9 3.9
N. Zeland - - 8.9 10.0 - -
Norway 3.8 3.2 5.2 6.6 - -
Portugal 11.8 5.3 6.5 4.6 7.8 6.0
Spain 20.8 16.5 29.2 19.0 28.3 16.0
Sweden 3.6 3.4 6.6 9.7 9.7 10.6
Svitzerland - - 4.7 3.0 - -
United
Kingdom
9.9 11.9 7.5 12.4 6.0 7.9
USA 7.4(2) 7.0(2) 6.5 7.0 5.0 4.9




























































































Table 3. Social Expenditure in the EU countries as a percentage of GNP
Country 1980 1986 1992
Belgium 28.0 29.4 27.8
Denmark 28.7 26.7 31.4
Germany 28.7 28.1 26.6
France 25.4 28.5 29.2
Ireland 21.6 24.1 21.6
Luxembourg 26.5 24.8 28.0
Netherlands 30.8 30.9 33.0
U. K. 21.5 24.3 27.2
EU 12 24.4 26.0 27.1
Greece 12.2 19.4 19.3
Italy 19.4 22.4 25.6
Portugal 14.7 16.3 17.6
Spain 18.1 19.5 22.5
Source: Eurostat, 1993.
Table 4. Main categories of social protection expenditure in EU 12





Belgium 11.9 6.0 2.6 2.9 1.9
Denmark 11.0 6.0 4.1 3.0 3.3
Germany 12.7 7.7 2.0 2.2 2.0
France 12.1 8.0 2.0 3.5 2.2
Ireland 5.7 6.1 3.0 1.5 2.2
Luxembourg 11.2 5.9 0.2 3.5 2.7
Netherlands 11.9 7.1 2.9 7.2 1.6
U. K. 10.8 5.1 1.6 3.1 2.6
EU 12 11.9 6.5 1.9 2.4 1.8
Greece 10.2 2.3 0.5 1.5 0.1
Italy 15.4 5.4 0.5 2.2 0.8
Portugal 7.0 5.3 0.8 \ 2 A 0.8
Spain 9.4 ^ 9 4.8 2.3 0.2




























































































The direct connection between these stylized facts is not easy to miss: 
participation in the labour force is low because the lack of services substituting 
for women's traditional caregiving work prevents women, and in particular 
mothers, from participating other than at a high personal and family cost. In 
addition, some of the direct transfers are regulated so as to give incentives for 
non-participation.
Unemployment and the unemployment difference between the sexes are 
high because the tertiary sector, private and public, which is in most countries 
the main source of women's employment, is underdeveloped: Bettio and Villa 
(1995) compute the missing jobs in services at over 2.500.000. In addition, there 
are specific labour market policies in place, which I call "handicap-privileges", 
which very effectively prevent hiring and promoting women in the private 
sector. They include:
- long mandatory maternity leave (5 months mandatory at 80% pay at 
birth, plus 6 months elective at 20% of the wage within the first two years), 
which prevents the hiring of young married or marriageable women;
- mandatory retirement age set at 55 for women in the private sector, 
which prevented employment of older women willing to re-enter the labour 
force after the childbearing age. This provision was abolished by the Dini 
reforms, of which later.
- the fact that the weekly working hours mandated by national labour 
contract in the private sector are long, and other forms of shorter time 
commitment to employment are strongly penalized, so that family life and time 
for childcare of a couple where both are employed is severely curtailed.
Let me stress that low participation and low employment are a waste of a 
most crucial economic resource for economic growth. The more so as Italian 
women are highly educated, and economic growth in the already industrialized 
countries in the years to come will depend more and more from the ability to 
take advantage of the human capital accumulation of men and women, in 
productions with high technological content. The Italian economy can ill afford, 
in the global era, to compete with the other economies while keeping women 
trapped in an inefficient use of time housekeeping. What is at stake therefore is 
not just an issue of women's politics but an issue of national economic policy.
Second, the Welfare State helps determine the degree of economic 
dependence/independence that women enjoy. Affluence and economic 
independence are not the same. Given the standard of living a woman enjoys, 




























































































possible. A person may have access to resources from four sources: proceedings 
from inherited or accumulated wealth belonging to the person, earnings of the 
person, transfers from the State to the person, or as an intrafamily transfer of 
resources. The latter in turn were wealth, earnings or transfers of another family 
member, and are therefore conditional on being a member of somebody's family 
and given at will of that family member. This makes the person dependent on 
that family member. This is the situation of children, and before the existence of 
the Welfare State, of the disabled and the elderly.2
It is also the situation of women who do not have inherited wealth and do 
not work for a wage. In Italy these are still the majority of women of working 
age, unless the Welfare State grants them a direct right, either a right as citizens, 
or a right based on the caregiving work they do for their family, which it does 
not in Italy.
Direct monetary transfers in the Italian Welfare State are job-based to the 
extreme. Transfers are basically of three kind:
- family allowances, who may be either contribution based (assegni 
familiari) or tax based (detrazioni) but they are paid to workers for their spouse 
and children;
- unemployment transfers, divided in three main programs: Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni and Mobility, which may be requested for their workers 
by the firms of more than 10 employees instead of laying workers off; and the 
ordinary individual unemployment subsidy which is very low. CIG is so job 
based that those who in other countries would be temporarily unemployed in 
Italy is still employed, albeit in CIG.
- pensions. Pensions, with the exception of the "social pension" which we 
will analyze later, are strictly work-based. They are paid either to people who 
cannot work (disability pensions) or who are the survivor of a worker 
(survivors’ benefits) or who worked and paid contributions for a number of 
years (seniority and retirement pensions).
2 It is interesting to notice that in the present political debate, in Italy, young people's 
dependence on their original family is considered a problem, women's dependence from their 
husbands is not. It is true that youth unemployment rates in Italy are very high. But young 
people are not therefore poor: they share in their original family resources, and their standard 
of consumption may be as high, if not higher, than in the countries where they earn their own 





























































































The fact that the Welfare State is work-based, coupled with the fact that 
women's participation and employment are so low, imply that the main route of 
access for women to transfers from the Welfare State is through their personal 
relation to a man who is a worker, i.e. through marriage. It is therefore not only 
familist, since services are produced in the family, but patriarchal, in that 
assumes and reproduces women's dependence on men.
Third, the fact that Italian Welfare State over provides transfers and 
under provides services shapes the distribution of domestic working time 
within the family. Italy is an extreme case of long working hours by women 
and short working hours for men. Italian men, providing on average 9 hours of 
domestic work a week, are the laziest in Europe as far as domestic work is 
concerned (Addis, 1997, chapter 4). This is the mirror image of what is 
explained above. Lack of public services implies that there is a large amount of 
work to do. Low women's participation and employment imply that there are 
women at home ready to do it. The generosity of the pension system means that 
many of them are relatively young pensioners. The fact that the State provides 
transfers rather than services implies that in Italy it is still customary, to an 
extent unusual in other European countries to hire domestic workers, mostly 
women, more recently women immigrants.
Fourth and last, lack of services, lack of economic independence of 
women who therefore feel that it may be risky to depend entirely on their 
children's fathers for their children's keeping in case of divorce, lack of part time 
or flexible time jobs and long working hours of women who are employed, 
maldistribution of working time between men and women and between women 
who are employed and women who are not, the latter setting standards of 
personal and children care that the first cannot hope to attain, and lack of any 
specific program to help mothers or single mothers, all contribute to inducea 
fertility rate which is the lowest ever in the world and in history, with 1,2 
children per fertile woman.
This is to me the clearest sign that in Italy there is a deep crisis not only of 
the "social contract" between the elderly and the young, but also of "social 




























































































MEANS TESTING AND GENDER EQUITY IN THE WELFARE STATE
Italy is an extreme case of women's low participation, high unemployment, 
dependency on work or marriage for access to welfare benefits, and low fertility. 
All these reflect a specific problem of "gender equity", i.e. a misallocation of 
resources between men and women, a lack of recognition, via public 
intervention, both of women's autonomous right to a work outside of the 
household and of the social value of caregiving, especially if devoted to 
reproduction.
We know that a distribution of resources among individuals who are 
different may be equitable according to one parameter, and unequitable 
according to one other parameter (a thorough discussion "equity" in income 
distribution is in Sen, 1992). The Welfare State attempts to achieve a 
distribution, which is equitable according to a number of parameters, for 
example need, work performed, effort, productivity, and social usefulness. Each 
of them defines a different dimension of equity.
These different dimensions of equity are inter-related, and they may even 
be in conflict. It is possible to design policies which, improving 
intergenerational equity, reduce equity between rich and poor families: think of 
an unemployment subsidy to the young, independent from parent's income. By 
the same token, it is possible to imagine policies which improve 
intergenerational and class equity but worsen gender equity. I will present real 
life cases of the latter: for example the ceiling on a couple's pension income, 
which cuts the lowest pension when the other rises above a threshold. It is 
possible to imagine policies, which redistribute between people who perform 
only domestic work and people who perform both domestic work and paid 
work. It is possible to device policies which help family formation, and policies 
which deter family formation, and therefore treat differently people who choose 
to marry and people who choose not to marry, i.e. to enter a very gendered 
relation. These are matters to be dealt with openly. If the present wave of 
reforms ignores the specific dimensions of gender equity, it runs the risk of 
worsening the unfair treatment of women, of reducing women’s labour supply, 
and of deterring family formation and fertility, while improving fairness 
between classes and generations.
Some of the pathologies of the Italian Welfare are linked to the need to 
provide care to to families. The only kind of work that was recognized as a 
source of indipendent rights was work for pay. Caregivers where only 
aknowledged as useless dependents: not as providers of domestic goods, but as 
consumers lacking an adequate source of cash. As a result of this lack of 




























































































(baby-pensions), false invalidity pensions, and misuse of hospitals to park frail 
elderly people who do not need costly medical care but only nursing homes, are 
all “creative” attempts to finance care.
In order to make public intervention equitable according to the 
parameters mentioned above, recognition of the fact that employment is not the 
only kind of work is missing. Caregiving work and reproductive work exist, are 
the presupposition upon which all other work and consumption are based, the 
ultimate producer of effective well being for the individuals, therefore they are 
relevant for social policy. Traditionally this was the work provided by full-time 
housewives. Now it may be provided by women working in their own house, by 
hired help, by public services, by private services, or by men in the house. It 
exists, and it is productive of utility and well being. Even if it is not easy to 
calculate its market value, there are ways to take it into account by fiscal and 
public policy.
This work exists, and somebody is doing it. It is a use of time which is 
different from leisure, it is work in domestic production. When the person who 
does domestic and caregiving work for her family - usually a woman - enters the 
labour market, she is giving up the value of the products of her domestic work, 
and needs resources to replace it. Notionally she must subtract from the value of 
her wages the value of the replacement costs for the services that she does not 
produce any more for the family. The net gain for her is smaller than for a 
person who does not perform such care and domestic work.3
Labour supplied by women responds much more to taxation than by men, 
exactly because net hourly earnings of women, once the value of the foregone 
household services is subtracted, are so low. Taxes are levied on the gross and 
are therefore proportionally higher on this net. Women’s labour supply is, as 
economists say, very elastic to taxation. A subsidy is but a tax with the opposite 
sign. From the economic point of view, subsidizing non-participation is equal to 
taxing further women’s labour supply. When there is a subsidy for housewives, a 
wife who chooses to work outside of her own home must subtract from her 
wages the value of her foregone services to her family, and in addition also the 
value of the subsidy that the family loses because of her working. This may 
happen because she loses the status of "dependent" upon which family
3 Conventional economic models use leisure as the only alternative choice variable to wage, 
assuming that since leisure has a positive value, as do goods produced in household, the two 
are equivalent. But from the point of view of social policy this cannot work: reproduction, 
and the welfare o f children, sick people and old people may depend on the amount of 
"leisure" that women can afford. The answer of the Italian Welfare is to finance this "leisure" 





























































































allowances and deduction are based, or because her wage increases the family 
income beyond the threshold for means tested benefits. She will, moreover, pay 
to the State taxes that will be used, among other things, to finance the subsidies 
to women who choose to work only within the household.
The fact that women's labour supply is very elastic to taxation implies that 
the "poverty trap" is even more stringent for women than it is for men. The 
"poverty trap" has been an important concept, for right or for wrong, in the 
welfare reform debate of England and the U.S. . It is the idea that unemployed 
people are prevented from entering low paying jobs by the fact that the 
difference between what they may earn, and what they will loose in welfare 
benefits if these are means-tested, is too small to repay for the work effort. 
Women are therefore “trapped” into domestic work.
Besides being inefficient, a Welfare State which actively promotes the 
unrecognized employment of half of its citizens in domestic work and within 
marriage is not equitable: it biases choices against paid work, and it biases 
choices in favour of marriage. It is certainly not coherent with liberal principles. 
At the same time, care work that women perform in the house is a vital function 
of the society and it contributes to its well being. The exit from the domestic 
work trap, therefore, must be such that this care work does not disappear, but is 
distributed more fairly.
The fact that Italian Welfare System is heavy in transfers and light in 
services is already a form of gender bias. Public services are often provided by 
women and substitute for traditionally women's work. Services, moreover, had 
until recently a rather universal character. In particular the National Health 
System may have been bureaucratic and inefficient but was so almost equally 
for men and for women. Through means testing, the access to services may 
become gender biased against women workers, a fact about which there is very 
little awareness. Families where both man and woman work for a low wage will 
have an higher chance of loosing access to benefits in comparison with families 
where only the man works with the same low wage. Therefore taxes paid by 
low-wage workers of both sexes will benefit only male low-wage workers, and 
their housekeeping wives, though domestic work needs to be done in both 
families.
We have recently observed a creeping of a variety of local means tests for 
access to many services, ranging from some medical procedures to nursery 
schools. This means testing at the local level has often been quite crude; the unit 
chosen for means testing was the nuclear family, with no consideration for 
possible alternatives, no allowance for the number of people who have to live on 




























































































The Ministry of Finance proposed a general scheme of "means test" to be 
used nationally by local administration, with or without modifications, to 
regulate access to all kinds of services. The scheme has been presented in the 
media as "riccometro", (“rich-meter”), it is more formally known as I.S.E. 
(Indicatore della Situazione Economica), and became law in march 1998. 
According to I.S.E., a family which requires some forms of social services or 
exemptions - nursery school, exemption from copayments on physicians' care, 
drugs, or medical tests, etc., - should answer a questionnaire, beyond the income 
declaration,4 providing information on other aspects of family composition and 
wealth. The scheme applies an equivalency scale to the income resulting from 
the questionnaire, taking in account the number of people that have to live on 
that income, if the parent is single, if there is any handicapped person in the 
family. A rather small allowance is made for the fact that both parents of minor 
children work, in the form of a slight increase in the parameters of the 
equivalency scale.
This is probably an improvement over the brute means testing just 
mentioned. In a related paper (Addis, 1998) I discuss the gender effects of 
means testing, the use of different techniques to address the issue of women’s 
poverty trap. In general, the test of means fails to take in account the number of 
earners, if it does not allow for a higher threshold for families with two wage 
earners and no "housekeeper". It will then punish women's work outside of the 
household, give incentive to non-participation, and be unequitable towards their 
work.
There are various techniques which take in account the fact that women's 
work outside of the family, while making the household cash-rich, makes it time 
poor. Besides the equivalency scale, one could use the exemption of a certain 
amount of the second earner's income from the compute of the threshold, or a 
direct increase of the threshold to be excluded from the benefit. One could use a 
minimum/maximum method, i.e. to give the subsidy to each individual earner, 
as long as his/her income is below a certain threshold (minimum), and as long as 
the spouse does not earn more than a given multiple than the minimum 
(maximum). One could, as a further option, use a computation of extended 
income. To compute extended income we add to the monetary income the
4 One may wonder why the declaration for income tax purposes is not, by itself alone, a proper 
way to measure income. The official reason given by those who accept the "riccometro" is that 
the “riccometro” asks questions about consumption, rather than on income, and then "assumes" 
an income from a given level of consumption. The unofficial reason is that income tax cheating 
in Italy is notoriously very high, in particular in the commercial sector, characterized by many 
small firms. The hope is that, while lying to the tax authority in order to save taxes is socially 
acceptable, voluntarily filing for social assistance on false pretence would be socially frowned 





























































































domestic work of the full time housekeeper, or else subtract the value of the 
domestic work foregone if there are no full time housekeepers in the home 
(Addabbo and Caiumi, 1998). A fiscal detraction below a threshold of income 
for the household where all the adults work, (rather than the present practice to 
apply a deduction for the household where one of the spouses devotes all her 
time to domestic production, of which later,) would also achieve the same aim.
In what follows, I will analyze the transfer programs of the Italian 
Welfare State and discuss how they may be modified in order to satisfy criteria 
of gender equity. I will consider equity between people who are biologically 
different, i.e. men and women, equity between work performed in the house and 
outside of the house, equity between people who choose to form a family and 
people who choose not to.
Family Allowances
There are two policies, which may be classified as family related cash transfers 
in Italy. The first applies to any citizen who presents an income declaration and 
has a "dependent". In addition, a second one holds for those who are employed 
and have a "dependent". One’s "dependent” may be a spouse or other family 
member living in the same household with an income lower than 5.500.000 lire 
a year, and one's children below 18 years of age or until 26 if they are in school.
The first is a tax credit: each person has the right to a detraction (i.e.: 
subtraction from the tax otherwise due) for the "dependent" spouse, and one for 
each child or other dependent. The 1996 budget set the amount of this deduction 
to 336.000 lire per child or other dependent, and a maximum of 1.057.552 (for 
the income bracket below 30.000.000) and a minimum of 817.552 lire (for the 
income bracket over 100.000.000 to infinity). The expected cost to the public 
coffers is 900 billion liras. From the economic point of view, the present 
deduction and the increase in the parameters of the equivalency scale for the 
families where both parents have a job work in the opposite direction. The 
present deduction gives to all families where the wife does not have a job; the 
second gives to families of low income where the family does have a job. 
Excluded are women who work, in families where income is not too low.
The second are the so called "assegni familiari" (family allowances). 
They are paid out by a special fund of the INPS, the National Institute for Social 
Provision, which is funded with contributions paid by all employers and all 





























































































They are given to workers, paid together with their monthly paycheck, but 
they are means tested based on a family income threshold. There are 16 
brackets. The threshold of the upper bracket, at 92.500 millions liras per year, is 
rather high. An amount is given for the dependent spouse, and an amount is 
given for each child. The amount given varies with the income bracket of the 
worker and with the number of dependents. The amount given for each 
dependent changes with the order number of the dependent. Table 5 shows the 
entire scale as of 7/1998.
The first version of "assegni familiari" was introduced in 1934, together 
with the 40 hours week, which implied a fall in the monthly wage that would 
have pushed large families deeper into poverty. Since 1978 "assegni familiari" 
are tax exempt. The last major revision had occurred with the law 31/3/1988 n. 
69. At the peak of their incidence, in 1953, the expenditure on such "assegni" 
was 2,70% of PIL. In 1995 it had fallen to 0,3%.
The program of the Olive Tree coalition called for an increase of the 
"assegni familiari" because they are presented as a good "family policy" to deal 
with the natality crisis, in particular by one group in the coalition, the "Social 
Cristians". They were markedly increased in 1994 and in 1995 (20.000 per 
month per child after the first, 84.000 lire after the second). The 1996 budget 
increased the expenditure on the "assegni" by 1.900 billion liras. In the presence 
of a disabled person, the income brackets have been shifted so that the threshold 
are higher but they are still calculated on the joint income: most of this increase 
is due to a 25% rise to the checks given to single parents. Given the most single 
parents are mothers, this is a step in favour of single working mothers which 




























































































Table 5. Income Brackets for Family Allowances, July 1998
People in the 
family
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 or +
Annual income 
(m+f)
From 0 to 
20.293
- - 253 485 695 953 1.200
20.294 to25.111 - - 222 427 658 932 1.163
25.112 to 29.929 - - 179 369 606 916 1.131
29.930 to34.744 - - 127 306 548 879 1.094 |
1 34.745 to 39.563 - - 85 216 468 789 983
| 39.564 to44.381 - - 50 158 421 757 946
44.382 to49.199 - - 30 111 342 705 904
49.200 to54.015 - - 30 75 263 657 851
54.016 to58.832 - - 25 50 199 615 825
58.833 to63.649 - - 25 50 178 436 772
63.650 to68.468 - - 25 45 178 299 567
68.469 to73.286 - - - 45 152 299 424
73.286 to78.104 - - - 45 152 256 424
78.105 to82.922 - - - - 152 256 366
82.923 to87.740 - - - - - 256 366
| 87.741 to92.559 - - - - - - 366
With the exception of a recent increase of benefits to single parents who are 
workers, the institute of the assegni mirrors the gender relations in the family 
and in the society of the '50s and sixties. They would work, as a means to 
achieve a more equitable distribution of income between rich and poor people, if 
most families where bi-parental, with a continuosly employed man and a 
housekeeping woman, and if the worker were willing to redistribute his earnings 
fairly to wife and children.
An increasing number of families does not meet these conditions, because 
of youth unemployment, of women’s employment, of delayed family formation, 




























































































Unemployment is high especially among men and women in the 
childbearing years, therefore linking a provision for poor children to the job of 
the head of the family is not an ideal solution, as children of the unemployed get 
nothing. Unemployment and lack of independent rights in the Welfare State 
delay family formation, and therefore autonomous access to this benefit, while 
the benefit is granted as long as young people remain in the original household 
of a worker. As a result, a record number of young men, in Italy, live with their 
parents through their twenties and well into their thirties. The "assegni", in 
addition, cannot manage labour market transitions from one job to the next, w ith 
short spells of unemployment in between, which characterize the youth labour 
market and the labour market of an economy with continuous technological 
change.
Besides being job-centered, the assegni are patriarchal, in that they 
assume that whatever is given to the head of the family will be fairly 
redistributed to the wife and to the members of the family. Such is often not the 
case. Because of this patriarchal bent, they are inadequate to manage a situation 
of family instability, separation and divorce. If the couple splits, the unemployed 
spouse of a worker has no independent right to them. In the event of family 
breakdown, they may accrue to the parent (the father) who has a job, even if in 
over 90% of the cases courts give custody to the mother.
The job-centered and patriarchal character of the Italian Welfare State is 
most clearly marked not by the programs which exists but by the programs 
which do not exist. There is no program designed to help the children of people 
who divorce or enter single parenthood, and who do not have a job.
In addition to all this, being means tested on the joint income of the 
family, the "assegni" are lost if the wife's earnings take the family income above 
the thresholds. The considerations of the former paragraph therefore apply. They 
discourage women from seeking paid employment, and may constitute for them 
a form of "poverty trap".
In my opinion, a general reform of the Italian Welfare should overcome 
the “assegni” in favour of provisions which are both universal in coverage, to 
cover young unemployed men and women, and targeted to need with a correct 
selection mechanism. Failing that, it is urgent to overcome at least the latter 
aspect of gender bias of the "assegni familiari". The one I personally favour 
would is the minimum/maximum option mentioned above. “Assegni” for every 
child may be due to any worker who earn less than a small amount X (for 
example: 20.000.000), as long as the spouse does not earn more than a large 
amount Y (for example: 80.000.000). This is a solution that does not strictly 




























































































more equitable towards the work of women, and it does not give incentive to 
non-participation.
Unemployment Benefits
There is widespread consensus among economists,5 sociologists and policy 
makers, that the Italian way of dealing with social insurance against the risk of 
unemployment is very inadequate to the task.
The system is based on a host of programs. In the past, the centerpiece 
was CIG (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni), divided in Ordinary and Special, and 
CIG is still the largest. Introduced in 1968, CIG Ordinaria is a mandatory 
contribution fund, opened at INPS, to finance labour hoarding of firms facing 
temporary falls in demand. The request for CIGO must be made by the 
company, and must be accepted by the local Inspectors for Work. CIGO pays 
80% of the wage, for 3 to 24 months. The employment relation between the firm 
and the worker is never broken: at the end of the period in CIGO, supposedly 
when the temporary problems of the company are solved, the worker goes back 
to work at the same firm.
CIG Speciale (CIGS) was meant for firms with over 200 employees, 
purportedly to face those cases when the problems were long term, like 
restructuring of the plants, but still mendable. It should have lasted up to 48 
months; it has been known to last, with legal and bureaucratic tricks, up to ten 
years. Since 1988 is financed directly by the Treasury. In fact it was and still is a 
very generous program for collectively dismissed workers, who are however 
still formally employed, and therefore prevented from looking for a new job.
In 1991 law n. 233 introduced some changes, reducing the time of the 
benefit, and introducing the "indennità' di mobilita'" (mobility benefit), and a 
program of pre-retirement for people at the end of CIG. Mobility benefit is 
similar to CIG, except it officially applies to firms with more than 15 
employees, lasts 12 months, and it is paid in the case where it is acknowledged 
that the firm will not reopen. It is also paid after the end of CIG benefits for 
firms with more than 200 employees.
Other forms of collective benefits recently introduced are the special 
benefits for the construction workers, who used to be heavy users of CIG for the 
winter months and are now under a separate program. The ordinary benefit for 
individual layoff, applied to people who therefore do not belong to the
5 For a thorough description of the unemployment benefits system and its history see 




























































































collective, firm managed programs, pays only 30% of the last wage for 6 
months; the worker must have worked legally and paid contributions for two 
years before qualifying.
By subsidizing labour hoarding, C1G boasts Italian firms’ productivity 
and biases competition with other European firms, and is therefore under attack 
by the European Union. CIG is a job-based, age and gender biased program: it 
favours those who have a job, against those who have never held a stable job; 
the old against the young; people who work in large firms against people who 
work in small firms or individually like domestic helpers. Since women are on 
average younger, may never have landed a stable job, and are on average 
employed in smaller firms, it is biased against women. A study by R. Trifiletti 
shows that the changes introduced in 1991 further decreased women's access to 
CIG benefits.A clear example of a reform that, while improving the overall 
quality of public intervention in the labour market, worsened its bias against 
women.
Proposals to eliminate altogether the CIG system and the "mobility" 
addition to it, in favour of an individually based, rather than collectively based, 
unemployment subsidy, or in favour of some form of minimum guaranteed 
income, are opposed both by employers and by trade unions. The case of 
unemployment subsidies is an example of the fact that women's lot is in general 
improved by measures, based on citizenship, which have universal coverage. 
Such measures acknowledge citizen's right to a security net independently from 
their performance in paid employment, and therefore implicitly acknowledge 
domestic and caregiving work.
Conversely, the kind of fragmented career, with shorter hours, times of 
withdrawal from participation due to caregiving work, with re-entrance in a 
different job, once characteristically feminine, is now more and more 
widespread to both sexes, as retraining is a constant need in a time of fast 
technological change. Therefore, overcoming the job-centered model today is 
not only equitable towards women, it would adjust public intervention to the 
needs of a changed labour market.
Pensions
Until the early 90’s, this familist, patriarchal welfare state, stingy in family 
assistance and unemployment benefits, was quite generous in the pension 
system. The ratio between contributions and benefits was very low with respect 
to the European average. It was very generous to the workers and as a 




























































































respect to the European average. The work performed by women in the 
household was never explicitly recognized as a source of citizen’s right. But the 
benefits devised for the workers have been stretched, sometimes beyond 
legality, to subsidize women’s work in the household, by providing them with 
semi-fake disability pensions, very early retirement, voluntary contributions to 
pension schemes after work interruptions, and such. Early retirement was the 
improper way in which the Italian State coped with men’s unemployment 
problems, and with the need to provide (women’s) care work to the family.
Before the recent wave of reforms, the Italian system provided for the end 
of the working life with two programs: voluntary seniority pensions (anzianita’), 
linked to the number of years the employed paid contributions, and mandatory 
old age pensions (vecchiaia) for all at a prescribed age.
The system is a pay as you go system; today's pensions are paid out oflhe 
contributions that today's worker pay. When they have not been large enough, 
the Treasury made up the difference. The system was acknowledged to be 
financially unsustainable in the medium run before the reforms; there are 
arguments about its sustainability today.
Before the reforms, the seniority pension allowed retirement on request as 
early as after 15 years, six month and one day of contribution in the public 
sector, while 25 years of contributions were needed in the private sector. The 
amount of benefits ceased to increase after 40 years of contributions, even if the 
worker kept working beyond 40 years until mandatory retirement age. Those 
who took seniority benefits could get a second job, before mandatory retirement 
age. Early retirement was in fact the security core over which a number of 
elderly women provided free services to their family and a number of elderly 
men provided cheap labour working with no contributions "in the black market" 
of small firms or in self employment.
In the private sector mandatory retirement age was set at 55 for women 
and 60 for men, and in the public sector at 60 for both ages, though in some 
careers it was possible to obtain an extension to 65. To obtain the maximum 
benefit in the private sector a woman should have been working since the age of 
15. This obvious bias was partially compensated by the fact that women, and not 
men, could pay voluntary contributions in addition to the normal amount to 
cover one year for each child, and thus get slightly larger benefits.
The labour market effects of the mandatory retirement age at 55 were 
never compensated, but were heavy. In the few instances when a woman could 
in the private sector access the high echelons of a career, she would be 




























































































training a woman of 45 coming back to work after the childbearing age was not 
recoverable in the ten years span before retirement, thus women were not hired 
in middle age. However, with a typical insider/outsider effect, the trade unions 
traditionally opposed moving women's mandatory retirement age up, even 
voluntarily, and notwithstanding the fact that, if women wanted to retire before 
the mandatory age, they could of course get seniority benefits.6
The reforms were enacted in waves, by the governments of Amato (1992- 
1993) Ciampi (1992-1993) and Dini (1995-1996).
The final reform gradually phases in a new system, which will be fully 
operational only for those who are newly hired. In the new system, benefits will 
not be earnings related but contribution related. Rules defining retirement age 
have been changed to make the system financially viable: age of retirement may 
vary, but the mandatory character of retirement at age 65 has been retained. This 
is common practice in Europe, as opposed to the U.S.A. .1 spot a peculiarity 
here. For the worker, to receive the pension is a right, to retire at a prescribed 
age is a duty. Even if he would still like to work and his employer would agree 
to keep him, he or she has to retire. Italy is living in a cultural climate where 
most politicians praise flexibility in the labour market, liberalism towards 
individual choice, and labour market institutions more similar to those in the 
U.S.A. to reap the same employment levels. Nonetheless, no proposals have 
been put forward to abolish the obligation to stop working and make retirement 
a voluntary choice jointly exercised by the worker and the employee. My guess 
is that this peculiarity is related to the fact that it would then be necessary to 
introduce, after a certain age, a degree of discretionality by the employer in 
firing the old worker, if no longer able. This would go against the grain in a 
system of industrial relation where no discretionary firing is allowed.
In the new system, approved under the Dini government, the mandatory 
retirement age is set at 65 for both sexes, allowing retirement since age 57 with 
a penalty of 3% of the pension per anticipated year. The years of contribution 
required for seniority benefits increased to 35. Early retirement in one form or 
another is therefore eliminated. People who have more than 18 years of 
contribution can retire according to the old rules. People who have been hired 
for the first time after the enaction of the reform are subject to the new rules. 
People who have been working and contributing for less than 18 years will see 
their pension calculated part with the old, part with the new rules. In order not to
6 The only possible explanation o f this fact is that the mandatory age forced a choice that 
otherwise would have not been accepted in the family. This may have been husbands' choice 
to have a full time housekeeper, imposed on their wives, or wives' choice not to carry a 
double burden, imposed on their husbands, or the desire by employers and workers, not to 




























































































penalize people who are about to retire and made plans and choices based on 
that expectation, the recent reforms created a creeping system, in which the age 
of mandatory retirement and the number of years of contribution required are 
moved forward one year at a time.
For the part that is presently earnings related, benefitshave been reduced: 
they are now calculated over the entire working life, rather than on the last 5 
years of working life. They will be lowered progressively from 80% to a lower 
percentage. The possibility of most voluntary contributions was canceled.
In addition, survivors’ benefits have been curtailed subject to means 
testing. It used to be that widow(er)s received 80% of the benefits that would 
have accrued to the worker. Now, if the widow(er)'s income from any source, 
including her work or her retirement pension, is above 26.755.950, the 
survivors’ benefits are cut by 25%; if the income is above 35.674.600 lire they 
are cut by 40%; if they are above 44.593.250 they are cut by 50%. As an 
exception to the general rule that for people who had already begun to enjoy the 
benefits there has been no change, benefits for survivors who are already 
receiving them, and whose income was above the level of 26.755.950 mentioned 
above, have been frozen (crystalized) at the present level.
From the gender point of view, equalization of the mandatory age for the 
two sexes, while a positive labour market measure, leaves an open problem. 
Who will now provide child-care services that elderly women have been 
providing until now, and who will deal with the typical bureaucratic quagmire of 
the public services in Italy? Minding grandchildren and queuing in various 
offices nowadays is typically grandmother's task. Lack of an available retired 
grandmother, in addition to lack of affordable good quality nursery schools, may 
further squeeze young working mothers’ already tight time resources, and 
therefore further hamper young women's fertility or their participation rate.
Lengthening of the years of contributions required for seniority pensions 
is gender biased, because women tend to have shorter contributive histories with 
gaps in their working careers due to family related events. This should be 
balanced by the fact that the system will become entirely contributive, allowing 
old age pensions to people with as few as five years of contribution.
Cuts in survivors’ benefits are of course particularly adverse to women, 
since, as women have a longer life expectancy than men and marry men who are 
older, women are the beneficiaries of most survivors’ pensions. It is, in addition, 
a blatant violation of equity between women who work for a wage and women 
who are full time housekeepers. A woman who still works, or who has a 




























































































survivors’ benefits cut. As a limiting case, a working widow with children 
should notionally subtract from her wage the cost of whatever services she uses 
to replace her own domestic work, the benefits she loses because of means 
testing, and, in addition, the amount of survivors’ pension that she loses by 
going to work. It may very well be that she is better off by choosing to stay 
home, because her extradomestic work adds very little to the wealth of her 
family. The fruits of her work will be literally taken back by the State.
Means testing survivors’ benefits may be construed as equitable between 
people with different income, because it cuts benefits to elderly widow(er)s who 
are already sufficiently well off; but it may also be construed as unequitable in 
failing to distinguish between women who worked only inside the home and 
women who worked inside the home and earned wage income. Women's earned 
income is treated as if it was unearned rent from property; no allowance is made 
from the fact that in order to earn it, women have to make an alternative use of 
their time, subtracting to other socially productive uses in their home.
There is a clear case of double standard at work. In the case of survivors' 
pensions, the consensus is that duty of the Welfare State is to provide only a 
decent minimum. Women who work and earn are already enough well off, 
therefore it is fair and legitimate to cut survivors’ benefits, even if this breaks 
the equity between work effort and social retribution, and between contributions 
made into the pension funds and receipts accruing from those contributions. In 
the case of high seniority pensions already accruing to not so elderly men, the 
same reasoning did not apply, the argument that the Welfare state should 
provide only a decent minimum was rejected. Proposals to apply a cap on higher 
pensions, in the form of a proportional cut to be applied after means testing, 
never gained any support, on the grounds that they would break the relation 
between contributive history and retribution, which the system aimed to 
preserve. Yet these are pensions that accrue to elderly men who are already well 
off. Contributions by a man whose wife does not hold a job are thus worth more 
than for a man whose wife does.
It is particularly noteworthy that these provisions concerning survivors, so 
blatantly unfair to women workers, went almost unnoticed in the public debate 
over the pension system. Elderly women and women who work have very little 
public voice; and/or, women are the only ones who may be persuaded to accept 




























































































"Minimum Pension" and "Social Benefit"
In the past, people who, at the mandatory retirement age, didn't have a long 
enough contributive history, had the right to a minimum pension. The same 
minimum pension accrued to people who worked 15 years (minimo) or less 
(integrata al minimo). After the IS"1 year the pension increased with job 
seniority." In 1996 minimum benefit was equal to 659.000 lire per month. This 
was means tested: if there was no other income, the 1NPS paid the full amount; 
if there was own income from any source up to two times this minimum, 
excluding one home, severance pay, and the minimum pension itself, the right to 
this benefit was lost.
The first wave of reform by the Amato Government introduced some 
changes: the number of years after which benefits begun to rise was moved from 
15 to 20 years, and the means test was moved, from personal income to family 
income. The rule was that a single person should not have an income double the 
benefits, and a couple three times as high as the benefit, in order to maintain the 
right to the benefit.
These moves were again clearly gender biased: it is women who tend to 
have short contributive histories, and therefore to be claimants of these pensions. 
Means testing to the couple’s income eliminated the pensions of those women 
who had worked for a short period of time and whose husbands were still 
working or had a modestly high pension.
The second wave of reforms, under the Dini Government in 1995, 
canceled the right to minimum integration altogether for those with fewer than 
18 years of contributions. If people who are today working fewer than 18 years 
will reach retirement age before reaching 20 years of contribution, they will not 
get the "minimum pension". They will have the right only to the "social benefit" 
(assegno sociale), which for the year 1998 was equal to 6.593.000 lire per year. 
This is not pension but is legally classified as "assistance".
Dini adjusted back at least in part the threshold for those already receiving 
the "minimum pension". It kept the reference to joint, rather than single, income, 
but the threshold for the couple receiving the minimum benefit was set to four 
times the minimum benefit, i.e. double the threshold for single pensioners, an 
improvement from women's point of view.
People who, at age 65, had no contributive history whatsoever because 
he/she did not ever pay any contribution - either because he/she did not work or 
because he/she was always hired illegally - in the past had the right to the so 




























































































existing in Italy. The amount was lower than that of the "minimum pension". In 
1995 it was set at 357.000 liras per month. In the last 20 years the number of 
recipients of these benefits decreased, from 840.000 in 1974 to 718.000 in 1995, 
as women begun to have enough contributions to get the "minimum". 78 out of
1.000 elderly citizens get it, 80% of them women. 41% of them are given in the 
South, 22,3% in the Center, 36.2% in the North. As shown by Monacelli (1996) 
the threshold for this "social pension" was set in a rather peculiar way. The 
target set for a couple was more than three times the target set for the single 
person. Couples or families with many people received enough to live near the 
poverty line; singles, divorced and widowed people were heavily penalized. For 
a couple where both people have a social pension, the death of one of the 
spouses could mean sudden further impoverishment for the survivor. It appeared 
as if the State preserved the family as long as two elderly people were living 
together. Once an elderly person remained alone, she - because in most cases the 
elderly person over 65 with right to the social pension is a woman - had no 
options but to join another family - typically her children's.
As of 1996, the "social pension" too was replaced by the "social benefit" 
that becomes, therefore, the single measure with which the Italian State deals 
with the poorest part of the elderly population. For the year 1998, the yearly 
amount of the "social benefit" is 6.593.600 (507.200 per month, for 13 months), 
for single people with zero income. If the income is between 0 and 6.593.000, 
people have the right to integration, up to the income of 6.593.000. Above
6.593.000 they have no right to the benefit. If people are married, then a joint 
income threshold exactly double that amount applies. If person X earns 0, and 
the spouse less than 6.593.000, person X receives the benefit. If the spouse earns 
between 6.593.000 to 13.187.200 liras, person X gets a reduced check to 
integrate an income of 13.187.000 for the couple; if the spouse earns more than 
13.187.200, person X gets nothing.
The incentive effects of this measure are not easily evaluated, and 
probably they are not particularly important from the point of view of increased 
efficiency of the system. Yet fairness is still a value in a society, even when the 
consequences of unfairness will be borne only by those who suffer it. Because 
of the difference in the average age of marriage between men and women, 
husbands reach 65 before wives do. At that age, a small wage income by the 
wife may make the husband loose the benefit. When both spouses are over 65, 
then the fact that one of the two - usually the husband - qualified for a low 
pension, implies that he has lost the benefits for the spouse, and he is now as 
well off as the person who did not work at all. He must be willing to share his 
already low income evenly with his spouse, and she cannot in any way make 
sure that this happens. Moreover a couple where nobody ever worked is made as 




























































































before reaching retirement. One may argue that, if we want to lift the extreme 
low end of an income distribution to a given minimum level, we will always be 
unfair to those who had reached that level by themselves. Yet, in my opinion 
this is one of the clearest cases in which it would not have been at all unfair to 
let some couples be slightly richer than others. Here, at the poorest end of the 
income distribution, treating each individual, married or not, as single is the only 
way to avoid leaving elderly married women in a position of total dependency 
on their husbands.
Last item in the pension reform is the institution at INPS in 1997 of a 
voluntary fund for the homemakers, “casalinghe". People who have no other 
job, and therefore full time home-makers, or anybody else, now have the 
possibility to insure themselves against job accidents and to earn the right to a 
pension by paying voluntary contribution into this fund. While the symbolic 
value of this act is certainly highly positive, because if affirms the citizenship of 
women who are full time housekeepers, the financial value of starting such 
insurance may be questionable for women who are married, given the fact that 
survivors’ benefits are then means tested.
CONCLUSIONS
What can we then say about the model of gender relations that the Italian 
Welfare State assumes and reproduces? Is the present wave of reform going to 
change it, and if so, in what direction?
Before the recent waves of reforms the Italian Welfare State was with 
respect to the European average heavy in transfers and poor in services. The 
transfer programs in turn were mostly job-based. Therefore they were too 
generous with pensions and too stingy with assistance, unable to cope with some 
situations of need. They also were patriarchal, in the sense that the right of 
women in welfare was based on her personal relation to a worker, of which she 
was assumed to be a "dependent". No autonomous right of women as citizens or 
as providers of caregiving work was recognized: instead, the Italian Welfare 
State stretched to the limits job-based benefits, which were then used for women 
to provide caregiving. Some of the pathologies of the Italian Welfare State 
(early retirement, misuse of disability benefits, and abuse of health facilities for 
assistance purposes) are related to the unwillingness to explicitly provide for 
care work.
The model of gender relations that was upheld was the traditional one, 
male breadwinner and woman housekeeper. In this view women's work is in the 




























































































function as such. Women's work outside of the home in this view was 
considered a quirk, an exception, a private choice for women who have very 
high earning capability, and could indulge in having both the traditional 
feminine role and the traditionally masculine one, with the higher social status 
attached to the latter. It was assumed that the State had no duty to support such 
trespassing.
Nonetheless, because women's entrance in the labour market is a 
powerful trend of economic development, women's employment rate has grown 
over the years, notwithstanding the lack of a proper system of services and 
transfers, even though at a slower rate than in other European countries. Women 
should therefore have begun to enjoy as workers the benefits that the job-based 
welfare system had denied them as citizens and care provider. But as soon as 
they arrived, as Trifiletti (1996) describes, the mat was taken from under their 
feet, so to speak. Benefits had to be cut because of the financial crisis.
This model of gender relation is still the underlying pattern of the Italian 
Welfare State. It has not been replaced by a new system designed along different 
lines. The upholding of the breadwinner/housekeeper model well beyond its 
time, was and is a source of problems for the system, not only for the women. 
By causing the pathologies, it was as much a factor in the crisis of the Welfare 
State as the simple demographics between the elderly and the young, albeit not 
as often and as explicitly recognized. It was a factor of the financial crisis 
because, by preventing women's entrance in the labour market, deprived the 
system of contributions. If women's employment level could grow fast to 
European levels, the problem of lack of contributors to the pay as you go 
scheme would improve. It was a factor in the consensus crisis because benefits, 
which were meant for one worker to keep a family, were perceived as too 
generous when two workers were married together and had no dependent adults. 
The fact that this was never recognized means that, in the most recent wave of 
reforms, the Italian Welfare State was merely adjusted, never explicitly revised 
to change its main gendered features.
Cutting benefits to those workers who are married to another worker, 
through means testing of joint income, was choosen as one of the main reform 
options. It is an option that reinforces, rather than changes, the old model of 
gender relations. It may disuade the second worker in the couple from ever 
seeking a job, because the foregone benefits become too large. This starts a 
vicious circle where no service sector develops because no services are needed, 
and therefore women's employment does not grow. It has very clear 
redistributive implications: women workers outside of the house have helped a 





























































































The amount of the cuts was almost mandatory once the Maastricht treaty 
was in place, but most scholars would agree that how to cut and where to cut are 
at least partially discretionary choices. They were made according to the 
political consensus about what is "fair" to cut or where there is less opposition to 
the cuts. Cutting benefits to workers married to a worker - in fact, cutting 
benefits to women who work outside the house, which is the main effect of 
means testing by joint income of the couple - was only one of the possible 
options, by no means the only one available. Cutting benefits to the richest 
workers was another. Freezing everybody's rights to benefits leaving unchanged 
the relative position of people was another.
The choice to penalize working couples undermines the internal 
coherence of the system. It is still heavily centered on the worker, but the 
worker is central, if he is a man; no longer central, if she is a woman. The 
patriarchal characters, therefore, increased rather than decreasing, in that it was 
moved into the public sphere. Men are worth more not only among family 
members, but also among workers; a view of gender, which was until now 
aknowledged only by employers who practiced wage discrimination. Women 
are given many incentives to remain in the position of "dependent". If they 
choose to become workers, they are not treated like men, but less well. Women's 
rights in the Welfare system are completely different according on whether they 
choose to work for pay or not to work for pay, to marry or not to marry. The 
final set of activities, through which most commodities become of use to people 
in their homes, therefore the main source of well being, is still almost 
completely out of the scene, a private act out of public recognition. The source 
of the pathological distortions is still there, and the conditions to realign 
women’s participation and employment rates to the European standards have not 
been improved: if anything, means testing might possibly worsen the problem.
The reform of the Welfare State could have been the occasion of a new 
social contract with women. Facing the need to cut expenditure because of 
financial crisis, the reform could have been oriented by a different deal. 
Transfers could have been cut overall, but redistributed on the basis of 
independent rights to those who provide care. Assistance in case of severe need 
could have been improved by targeting, without creating new poverty traps. The 
quality of services could have improved if labour market policies had given 
women, who staff these services, the opportunity to enter the labour force in 
larger numbers and to work without neglecting family care.7 In other words,
7 In the political discourse, we hear that the job-centered character of the Welfare system 
should change to become family-centered. Even the liberal forces seem to share the 
consensus about this aim. There exceptions, especially within the left: most notably 
Francesca Izzo, the MP in charge of women's policies in the PDS. But, overall, neither the 




























































































policies could have been oriented by a different view of gender relations: one in 
which women’s agency and women's autonomous rights are recognized, and 
women's freedom to choose respected. Where people of different sexes are both, 
together, engaged in raising families, sharing domestic work and providing the 
financial resources needed to the task. A view of gender relations which is rather 
widespread, but which seems not to have made its inroads, yet, in the policy­
making community in charge of the Italian Welfare State reforms.
There is still time. The process of reform of the Italian Welfare State is far 
from closed. After the recent change in Government, from Prodi to D’Alema, 
some the issues I have been discussing are slowly coming to the fore. We may 
still hope that the final product of the leftist intervention on welfare will render 
Italy finally “a normal country” in gender relations as well.
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pact with women, in term of efficiency and increased productivity of the entire economic 
system, and to assert it forcefully. Equity towards women was sacrificed to the needs of 





























































































Addis E. (1997) E c o n o m ia  e  D iffe re n ze  d i  G en ere , C.L.U.E.B., Bologna.
Addis, E. (1998) "Gender Effects of Means Testing: the Italian case" paper 
presented to the Conference “Reforming Social Assistance and Social Services", 
Forum “Recasting the European Welfare States”, European University Institute, 
Dec. 1l - ^ *  , mimeo.
Addabbo, T. and Caiumi A. (1998) “Extended Income and Inequality by Gender 
in Italy” paper presented to the 25th conference of the IARW, Cambridge, 
August 1998, and CNEL, research project directed by A. Picchio.
Atkinson A. B. (1995) P u b lic  E c o n o m ic s  In  A ction , Oxford, Oxford U. P.
Bettio, F. e P. Villa ( 1996) "Un modello al bivio", in DWF 4.
Bimbi, F. (1998) "Cittadinanza delle donne e politiche familiari", paper 
presented to the seminar "Genere e Cittadinanza in Europa", Roma, 25-26 june 
1998, mimeo.
Bonke, J. (1993) "The Distribution of Time and Money in the Family", in 
Carlsen, S. e J.L. Lansen (eds.) The E q u a lity  D ilem m a , Copenhagen: The 
Danish Equal Status Council.
De Leonardis, O. (1998) In un d iv e r s o  W elfare , Milano, Feltrinelli.
Dell'Aringa C. e Samek Ludovici L. (1996) "Gli ammortizzatori della 
disoccupazione: l'esperienza italiana", Q u a lità ' E q u ità ', 3.
Esping Andersen, G. (1996) W elfa re  S ta te s  in tra n sitio n , London, Sage.
Equal Opportunity Unit, Div.V. (1997) In d iv id u a liz in g  S o c ia l R ig h ts , Report, 
January.
Ferber, M. A. e J. A. Nelson, (eds) (1993) B e y o n d  E co n o m ic  M an : F em in ist 
T h eo ry  a n d  E c o n o m ic s , Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Ferrera, M. (1998) L e  tr a p p o le  d e l  W elfare, Bologna, Il Mulino.
Gershuny, J. (1995) "Gender Convergence and Public Regulation", Paper 





























































































Gustavsson S. and Stafford, F. (1994) "Three regimes of childcare: the U.S., the 
Netherlands and Sveden", in R. Blank, ( ed . )  S o c ia l P ro te c t io n  v e rsu s  E co n o m ic  
F le x ib ility , Chicago, Chicago U.P., 333-62.
Monacelli, D. (1996) "Assessing public action in Italy: Elderly assistance and 
the social pension scheme", Mimeo, Bank of Italy.
Nelson, J. (1996) F em in ism , O b je c tiv ity , a n d  E co n o m ics , Routledge, London.
Orloff, A. S. (1996) "Gender in the Welfare State" , A n n u a l R e v ie w  o f  S o c io lo g y ,
22.
Pennacchi, L. (1997) L o S ta to  S o c ia le  d e l  fu tu r o , Roma, Donzelli.
Rossi, N. (1997) M en o  a i  p a d r i  e  p iu '  a i  f ig l i ,  Bologna, Il Mulino.
A. Sen ( 1992) In e q u a lity  re e x a m in e d , Oxford, Oxford UP.
Trifiletti, R. (1996) "Mediterranean Welfare regimes and the worsening position 
of women", paper presented at the Interdisciplinary Women's Studies Seminar, 































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 





□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1999/2000





































































































Working Papers of the European Forum
EUF No. 95/1
Diemut BUBECK




What Model for the Committee of the 
Regions? Past Experiences and Future 
Perspectives
EUF No. 95/3 
Jens BONKE
The Concepts of Work and Care - An 
Economic Perspective Applied to Britain 
and Denmark
EUF No. 95/4 
Jens BONKE
Education, Work and Gender - 
An International Comparison
EUF No. 95/5 
Henriette MAASSEN VAN DEN 
BRINK/Wim GROOT 
Household Production and Time 
Allocation, the End of the Male 
Chauvinist Model
EUF No. 95/6 
Andrds BARRERA-GONZALEZ 
Language, Collective Identities and 
Nationalism in Catalonia, and Spain in 
General
EU F No. 95/7 
Diemut BUBECK
Gender, Work and Citizenship: Between 
Social Realities and Utopian Visions
EU F No. 95/8 
Miriam A. GLUCKSMANN 
Gendered Economies of Time: Women 
Workers in North-West England
EUF No. 96/1 
David PURDY
Jobs, Work and Citizens’ Income: Four 
Strategies and a New Regime










Changing Parameters of Citizenship and 




Poor Citizens. Social Citizenship and the




Citizenship and Poverty. The Role of 
Institutions in the Structuring of Social 
Exclusion
EUF No. 98/2 
Massimo LA TORRE 




Structuring Migration in a Historical 
Perspective: The Case of Traveling East 
Europeans
EUF No. 98/4 
Virginie GUIRAUDON 
International Human Rights Norms and 






























































































WL^form ation of Immigration 
Immigration Control and 
ationality Laws in Europe: A 
Comparative Approach
ElIF No. 98/6
Public Services and Citizenship in
European Law
Mark FREEDLAND
Law, Public Services, and Citizenship -
New Domains, New Regimes?
Silvana SCIARRA
Labour Law - A Bridge Between Public 
Services and Citizenship Rights
EUF No. 99/1
Virginie GU1RAUDON 
The Marshallian Triptych Re-Ordered: 
The Role of Courts and Bureaucracies in 
Furthering Migrant Social Rights
EUF No. 99/2
Ewa MORAWSKA
The New-Old Transmigrants, their
Transnational Lives, and Ethnicization: A




Ending the Entitlement of Poor Mothers,
Expanding the Claims of Poor Employed
Parents: Gender, Race, Class in
Contemporary US Social Policy
EUF No. 99/4
Fiona ROSS
“Beyond Left and Right”: The New 
P artisan  Politics of Welfare
EUF No. 99/5
Elisabetta ADDIS
Gender in the Italian Welfare State
Reforms
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
